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Abstract. Black-box transformations have been extensively studied in
algorithmic mechanism design as a generic tool for converting algorithms
into truthful mechanisms without degrading the approximation guaran-
tees. While such transformations have been designed for a variety of
settings, Chawla et al. showed that no fully general black-box transfor-
mation exists for single-parameter environments. In this paper, we inves-
tigate the potentials and limits of black-box transformations in the prior-
free (i.e., non-Bayesian) setting in downward-closed single-parameter en-
vironments, a large and important class of environments in mechanism
design. On the positive side, we show that such a transformation can
preserve a constant fraction of the welfare at every input if the private
valuations of the agents take on a constant number of values that are far
apart, while on the negative side, we show that this task is not possible
for general private valuations.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design is a science of rule-making. Its goal is to design rules so that
individual strategic behavior of the agents leads to desirable global outcomes. Al-
gorithmic mechanism design, one of the initial and most well-studied branches of
algorithmic game theory, studies the tradeoff between optimizing the global out-
come, respecting the incentive constraints for individual agents, and maintaining
the computational tractability of the mechanism [13]. A major line of work in
algorithmic mechanism design involves taking a setting where the optimization
problem is computationally intractable, and designing computationally tractable
mechanisms that yield a good global outcome and such that the agents have a
truth-telling incentive. Ideally, the mechanisms would match the best-known ap-
proximation guarantees for computationally tractable optimization algorithms
in that setting. In other words, we want to obtain truthfulness from agents in as
many settings as possible without having to pay for more computation.
In the past two decades, this goal of algorithmic mechanism design has been
met in a wide range of prior-free as well as Bayesian settings. For instance,
Briest et al. [3] showed how to transform pseudopolynomial algorithms for sev-
eral problems, including knapsack, constrained shortest path, and scheduling,
into monotone fully polynomial time approximation schemes (FPTAS), which
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lead to efficient and truthful auctions for these problems. Lavi and Swamy [11]
constructed a general reduction technique via linear programming that applies
to a wide range of problems. The widespread success of designing computation-
ally tractable mechanisms with optimal approximation guarantees has raised
the question of whether there exists a generic method for transforming any com-
putationally tractable algorithm into a computationally tractable mechanism
without degrading the approximation guarantee. Such a method would not be
allowed access to the description of the algorithm but instead would only be able
to query the algorithm at specific inputs, and is therefore known as a “black-box
transformation”.
An important work that demonstrates a limit of the powers of black-box
transformations was done by Chawla et al. [5], who showed among other things
that no fully general black-box transformation exists for single-parameter envi-
ronments in the prior-free setting. In particular, for any transformation, there
exists an algorithm (along with a feasibility set) such that the transformation
degrades the approximation ratio of the algorithm by at least a polynomial fac-
tor. The result holds even when the private valuations can take on only two
values; Chawla et al. provided a construction with two private valuations l < h
satisfying h/l = n7/10, where n is the number of agents. Pass and Seth [14]
extended this result by allowing the transformation access to the feasibility set
while assuming the existence of cryptographic one-way functions.
Even though no fully general black-box transformation exists for single-
parameter environments, it is still conceivable that there are transformations
that work for certain large subclasses of such environments. One important sub-
class, which is the main subject of our paper, is that of downward-closed envi-
ronments, i.e., environments in which any subset of a feasible allocation is also
feasible. The construction used by Chawla et al. [5], later built upon by Pass
and Seth [14], relies heavily on the non-downward-closedness of the feasibility
set. The construction only includes three feasible allocations, and it is crucial
that the transformation cannot arbitrarily “round down” the allocations as it
would be able to if the feasibility set were downward-closed. Since downward-
closed environments occur in a wide variety of settings in mechanism design,
including knapsack auctions and combinatorial auctions, we find the question
that we study to be a natural and important one. We consider such settings and
assume, crucially, that the black-box transformation is aware that the feasible
set is downward-closed. As a result, when the transformation makes a query
to the algorithm, it can potentially learn many more feasible allocations than
merely the one it obtains. In this paper, we investigate the potentials and limits
of black-box transformations when they are endowed with this extra power.
1.1 Our results
Throughout the paper, we consider the prior-free (i.e., non-Bayesian) setting.
In Section 3, we show the limits of black-box transformations in downward-
closed environments. We prove that such transformations cannot preserve the
full welfare at every input, even when the private valuations can take on only
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two arbitrary values (Theorem 1). Preserving a constant fraction of the welfare
pointwise is impossible if the ratio between the two values l < h is sublinear,
i.e., h/l ∈ O(nα) for α ∈ [0, 1), where n is the number of agents (Theorems 2
and 3), while preserving the approximation ratio is also impossible if the values
are within a constant factor of each other and the transformation is restricted
to querying inputs of Hamming distance o(n) away from its input (Theorem 4).
In Section 4, we show the powers of black-box transformations in downward-
closed environments. We prove that when the private valuations can take on only
a constant number of values, each pair of values separated by a ratio of Ω(n),
it becomes possible for a transformation to preserve a constant fraction of the
welfare pointwise, and therefore the approximation ratio as well (Theorem 5).
The same is also true if the private valuations are all within a constant factor
of each other (Theorem 8). Combined with the negative results, this gives us
a complete picture of constant-fraction welfare-preserving transformations for
multiple input values. Not only are these results interesting in their own right,
but they also demonstrate the borders of the negative results that we can hope
to prove.
The results are summarized in Table 1 for the case where the private valu-
ations can take on two values, but they can be generalized to any constant-size
range of private valuations as well.
100% point-
wise
Constant
fraction
pointwise
100% approx ratio Constant
fraction ap-
prox ratio
h/l = n7/10;
F unknown, not
downward-closed
No [5] No [5] No [5] No [5]
h/l ∈ Ω(n);
F known,
downward-closed
No (Theorem
1)
Yes (Theorem
5)
? Yes (Theorem
5)
h/l ∈ Θ(1);
F known,
downward-closed
No (Theorem
1)
No (Theorem
2)
No if restricted to Ham-
ming distance f(n) ∈
o(n), F unknown (The-
orem 4)
Yes (Theorem
8)
h/l ∈ O(nα)
for α ∈ (0, 1);
F known,
downward-closed
No (Theorem
1)
No (Theorem
3)
? ?
Table 1. Summary of our results for the case where the private valuations take on
two values l < h. The results can be generalized to any constant-size range of private
valuations.
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1.2 Related work
Besides the works already mentioned, black-box transformations have been ob-
tained in a variety of other prior-free and Bayesian settings. In the prior-free
setting, Goel et al. [7] presented a reduction for symmetric single-parameter
problems with a logarithmic loss in approximation, and later Huang et al. [10]
improved the reduction to obtain arbitrarily small loss. Dughmi and Rough-
garden [6] designed a reduction for the class of multi-parameter problems that
admit an FPTAS and can be encoded as a packing problem, while Babaioff et
al. [1] considered reductions for single-valued combinatorial auction problems.
Reductions that preserve the approximation guarantees have also been obtained
in the single-parameter Bayesian setting by Hartline and Lucier [9], and their
work was later extended to multi-parameter settings by Bei and Huang [2], Cai
et al. [4], and Hartline et al. [8].
2 Preliminaries
We will be concerned with single-parameter environments. Such an environment
consists of some number n of agents. Each agent i has a private valuation vi ∈ R,
its value “per unit of stuff” that it gets. In addition, there is a feasibility set F ,
which specifies the allocations that can be made to the agents. Each element
of F is a vector (xi)
n
i=1, where xi ∈ R denotes the “amount of stuff” given
to agent i. For instance, in single-item auctions, F consists of the vectors with
xi ∈ {0, 1} and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. A more general and well-studied type of auctions is
called knapsack auctions, in which each agent is endowed with a public size wi
along with its private valuation vi, and the seller has some public capacity W .
The feasibility set of a knapsack auction consists of the vectors with xi ∈ {0, 1}
and
∑n
i=1 wixi ≤ W . In this paper, we will assume that the feasibility set F
is downward-closed, which means that if we take an allocation and decrease
the amount of stuff given to one of the agents, then the resulting allocation is
also feasible. Downward-closedness is an assumption that holds in many natural
settings, including the aforementioned auctions.
Algorithms An algorithm (or allocation rule) A is a function that takes as input
a valuation vector v = (vi)
n
i=1 and outputs an allocation x = (xi)
n
i=1. We will
consider the social welfare objective—the welfare of A at v is given by v · x =
v1x1+ · · ·+ vnxn, where x ∈ F is the allocation that A returns at v. We denote
by OPTF (v) the maximum welfare at valuation vector v over all allocations
in F . The (worst-case) approximation ratio of A is given by approxF (A) =
minv
A(v)
OPTF (v)
, where we slightly abuse notation and use A(v) to denote the the
allocation returned by A at v as well as the welfare of that allocation at v. Note
that by definition, approxF (A) ≤ 1 for all F and A.
Transformations A transformation T is an algorithm that has black-box access
to some other algorithm A, i.e., it can make queries to A. In each query, T
On Black-Box Transformations in Downward-Closed Environments 5
specifies a valuation vector v and obtains the allocation that A returns at v. We
write T (A) for a transformation T with access to the algorithm A. Importantly,
we assume that T has the knowledge that the feasibility set F is downward-
closed. For the strongest possible negative results, we assume whenever possible
that (i) T has knowledge of F , i.e., it can make a polynomial number of queries
to ask whether a particular allocation belongs to F , and (ii) T is adaptive, i.e., it
can adjust its next query based on the responses it received for previous queries.
For strongest positive results, our transformation T does not make queries about
F and is also not adaptive. We will be clear about our assumptions on T for
each result.
Mechanisms A mechanism is a procedure that consists of eliciting declared pri-
vate valuations (bi)
n
i=1 from the agents, and then applying an allocation rule and
a payment rule on the elicited valuations. The allocation rule determines the al-
location (xi)
n
i=1 and the payment rule determines the prices (pi)
n
i=1 to charge
the agents. We are interested in transformations that, when coupled with any
algorithm, lead to truthful mechanisms, meaning that it is always in the best
interest for each agent i to declare the true valuation vi to the mechanism, no
matter what the other agents do. A seminal result by Myerson [12] states that
an allocation rule can be supplemented with a payment rule to yield a truthful
mechanism exactly when the allocation rule is monotone. Monotonicity of an
allocation rule means that if an agent increases its declared valuation while the
declared valuations of the remaining agents stay fixed, then the agent is allocated
at least as much stuff as before by the allocation rule. Therefore, the transfor-
mations that yield truthful mechanisms are exactly the ones that constitute a
monotone allocation rule for any algorithm.
Properties of transformations We call a transformation T monotone if T (A)
is a monotone allocation rule for any algorithm A. Furthermore, T is called
welfare-preserving if T (A) preserves the welfare of A at every input for any
algorithm A, and constant-fraction welfare-preserving if T (A) preserves a con-
stant fraction of the welfare of A at every input for any algorithm A. Similarly,
T is approximation-ratio-preserving if T (A) preserves the approximation ratio
of A for any algorithm A, and constant-fraction approximation-ratio-preserving
if T (A) preserves a constant fraction of the approximation ratio of A for any
algorithm A. Note that a (constant-fraction) welfare-preserving transformation
is also (constant-fraction) approximation-ratio-preserving.
3 Negative Results
In this section, we consider the limits of black-box transformation in downward-
closed environments. First, we show that no monotone black-box transformation
preserves, up to a constant factor, the welfare of any original algorithm A point-
wise. We then show that if a monotone black-box transformation preserves the
approximation ratio of any given input algorithm A, then on some input v it
must query A on an input that has Hamming distance Ω(n) from v.
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3.1 Welfare-preserving transformations
We begin by considering the highest possible benchmark for the transformation:
preserving the full welfare of any algorithm at every input. Our first theorem
shows that this benchmark is impossible to fulfill even when the private valua-
tions can take on only two arbitrary values.
Theorem 1. Let l < h be arbitrary values (possibly depending on n). There does
not exist a polynomial-time, monotone, welfare-preserving transformation, even
when the transformation is allowed to be randomized and adaptive and make a
polynomial number of queries to F .
Before we go into the formal proof, we give a high-level intuition. We handle
the easier case of deterministic and non-adaptive transformations before moving
to general transformations. We will consider a class of algorithms from which one
algorithm A is selected randomly. For each algorithm A, our feasibility set will
contain two maximal allocations C and D; the only allocations in F are those
that are subsets of C or D. The allocation C is only returned at a “special input”
B1, and the allocation itself as well as the special input depends on the algorithm
A we choose from the class. At any other input, the allocation D is returned.
Using monotonicity of the transformation, we will show that at an input that is
“far away” from B1, the transformation still needs to know the allocation C in
order to preserve the full welfare. However, because of the randomization, the
probability the transformation can discover either the allocation C or the special
input B1 when it is given the faraway input is exponentially low, meaning that
the transformation cannot achieve its goal.
Proof. Assume first that the transformation T is deterministic and non-adaptive.
Suppose that the input is of length n = 4m. The algorithm A will be chosen
randomly. To begin, we define the preliminary algorithm A as follows.
– At input B1 =
2m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l, A returns output
C =
m+1 are 1’s︷ ︸︸ ︷
10110 . . .1
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . .0
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . . 1, where the m+ 1 1’s in the first 2m positions
are uniformly randomized. Note that the randomization is in the step of
choosing the algorithm A, but the resulting algorithm A itself is a determin-
istic algorithm. We call this input the special input ;
– At any other input, A returns D =
2m︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . . 0
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . .1
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . .1.
In the real algorithmA, we permute uniformly at random the last 3m/2 positions
of the inputs as well as the corresponding allocations. Again, this permutation
is only for choosing the (deterministic) algorithm A.
Consider any algorithm A that we might choose, and assume without loss of
generality that in the special input of this algorithm, the l’s are in the last m
positions. To preserve the welfare at input B1, T must return C = A(B1) itself,
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since returning any strict subset of C or returning D (or any subset of D) would
yield a lower welfare.
Next, consider the input B2 =
2m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . hl
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l, with the only change
from B1 being in the rightmost position of the middle block. By monotonicity,
T must return 0 in that position. In order to preserve the welfare at B2, T must
return a subset of C, since otherwise it would have to return a strict subset of
D, which would yield a lower welfare.
Now, consider inputs B3 =
2m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . hll
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l, B4 =
2m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . hlll
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l,
and so on with one extra l in each input, up to Bm/2+1 =
2m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m/2︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m/2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l.
By a similar argument, T must return a subset of C at all of these inputs. In
particular, T must return a subset of C at Bm/2+1.
In order to preserve the welfare at Bm/2+1, T must return at least m/2 1’s in
the first 2m positions. If T tries to find such an allocation by querying F , then
since the positions of the m+1 1’s in the first 2m positions are chosen randomly,
the probability of success for each query is at most
(m+1m/2)
( 2mm/2)
< 1poly(n) . Hence T
will succeed within a polynomial number of queries with low probability.
Alternatively, T might try to find the special input B1 by querying A. How-
ever, recall that we randomly permute the last 3m/2 positions of the inputs and
their corresponding allocations. In order to find the special input B1, T must
correctly choose m/2 out of the 3m/2 positions to change to h. Once again,
the probability of success for each query is less than 1poly(n) . Hence T will again
succeed within a polynomial number of queries with low probability. Combined
with the previous paragraph, this means that T is unlikely to succeed if it is
deterministic and non-adaptive.
Now assume that T is possibly adaptive. We will make sure that for each
“unsuccessful” query to A or F , T learns no new information. This is already
the case for queries to A, as for any unsuccessful query, T simply finds out
the canonical allocation D. To prevent T from learning new information from
unsuccessful queries to F , we insert “fake” allocations into F . In particular, we
insert all allocations with m/2− 1 1’s in the first 2m positions and all 1’s in the
last m positions (before the permutation of indices) into F , as well as subsets of
these allocations. As such, a successful query to F that contains at most m/2−1
1’s in the first 2m positions does not give T any useful information.
Finally, assume that T is allowed to be randomized. Since our algorithm
A is also chosen randomly by uniformly permuting the positions of 1’s in the
allocation as well as permuting the indices, the probability of success of T in
guessing the special input or an allocation that returns at least m/2 1’s in the
first 2m positions cannot increase even if it randomizes its choices. ⊓⊔
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3.2 Constant-fraction welfare-preserving transformations
Even though Theorem 1 shows that it is impossible for a transformation to pre-
serve the full welfare pointwise, it would still be interesting if the transformation
can preserve a constant fraction of the welfare pointwise. However, as we show
in this subsection, it turns out that this weaker requirement is also impossible to
satisfy. Our next two theorems show that preserving a constant fraction point-
wise is impossible when the ratio h/l is sublinear, i.e., h/l ∈ O(nα) for some
α ∈ [0, 1). We first consider the case where h/l is constant (Theorem 2), and
later generalize to h/l ∈ O(nα) for some α ∈ [0, 1) (Theorem 3). Together with
Theorem 5, which exhibits an example of a constant-fraction welfare-preserving
transformation when h/l ∈ Ω(n), we have a complete picture of constant-fraction
welfare-preserving transformations when there are two input values.
Theorem 2. Let l < h be such that h/l is constant. There does not exist
a polynomial-time, monotone, constant-fraction welfare-preserving transforma-
tion, even when the transformation is allowed to be randomized and adaptive and
make a polynomial number of queries to F .
We give an outline of the proof, which bears a resemblance to the proof of
Theorem 1 but contains differences in the execution. We start with a determin-
istic and non-adaptive transformation T . Our feasibility set will contain two
maximal allocations C and D, as well as subsets of any of these two allocations.
The “special allocation” C is only returned at the “special input” B1. Both the
special allocation and the special input are chosen based on the queries that T
makes to A and F at various inputs. At any other input, the allocation D is
returned. Using the monotonicity of the transformation, we find another input
Bm+1 far away from B1 where we have to return a subset of C that is not a
subset of D. By our choice of the special allocation and special input, we ensure
that at input Bm+1, the transformation neither makes a query at B1 nor makes
a successful query to F . This implies that T cannot succeed within a polynomial
number of queries.
Proof. Assume first that the transformation T is deterministic and non-adaptive.
Suppose that the input is of length n = m6 +m3. Note that the sets poly(m)
and poly(n) are identical.
Let X denote the set of inputs with m5 l’s in the first m6 positions followed
by m3 h’s, and let Y denote the set of inputs with m5 −m l’s in the first m6
positions, followed by m3 h’s. We have |X | =
(
m6
m5
)
and |Y | =
(
m6
m5−m
)
. Since
|X | > |Y | · poly(n), there exists an input in X that is not in the (polynomially
long) query list of T for any input in Y . Assume without loss of generality that
B1, defined below, is one such input.
Consider the algorithm A as follows:
– At input B1 =
m6−m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l
m3︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h, A returns
C =
m6−m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . . 0
m4 are 1’s︷ ︸︸ ︷
10110 . . .1
m3︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . .0, where the m4 1’s in the m5 positions of the
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middle block are to be chosen later. We call this input the special input, and
the corresponding allocation the special allocation;
– At any other input, A returns D =
m6−m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . . 0
m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . .0
m3︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . .1.
For large enough m, to preserve a constant fraction of the welfare at input
B1, T cannot return a subset of D. Hence T must return a subset of C = A(B1).
Consider the input B2 =
m6−m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m5︷ ︸︸ ︷
hll . . . l
m3︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h, with the only change from
B1 being in the leftmost position of the middle block. (Here we choose the left-
most position because this position of C contains a 1 in the particular choice of
C above; otherwise we choose any position of C that contains a 1.) By mono-
tonicity, T must return a 1 in the middle block for B2, so it cannot return a
subset of D. Moreover, for large enough m, to preserve a constant fraction of the
welfare at B2, T must return at least m
2 1’s in the middle block. In particular,
there is still a 1 corresponding to an l in the middle block.
Similarly, we can define inputs B3, B4, . . . , Bm+1 so that Bi has i − 1 h’s in
the middle block and there is still a 1 corresponding to an l in the middle block.
For each of these inputs, T must return at leastm2 1’s in the middle block. Note
also that Bm+1 ∈ Y .
Now, the special allocation is at B1, and by our assumption above, T does
not find out by querying A at B1 when it is presented with Bm+1 ∈ Y . The
only other possibility for T to discover the special allocation is to query F .
There are
(
m5
m
)
inputs of Y whose first m6 −m5 positions are all h’s, and these
are the only inputs at which T can benefit from a “successful” query to F .
When T makes a query at each of these inputs, it must pick an allocation
with at least m2 1’s in the m5 positions. From the perspective of us preventing
the transformation T from achieving its goal, this rules out at most
(
m5−m2
m4−m2
)
allocations. The total number of possible allocations that we can choose is
(
m5
m4
)
.
Since
(
m5
m
)
·
(
m5−m2
m4−m2
)
· poly(n) <
(
m5
m4
)
, this means that for some choice of 1’s in
m4 out of the m5 positions in the middle block, T does not succeed in finding an
allocation with at least m2 1’s. By making this choice, we ensure that T cannot
succeed within a polynomial number of queries.
Finally, we generalize to adaptive and randomized transformations T in a
similar way as in Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
Using a similar construction, we can generalize the impossibility result to the
case where h/l ∈ O(nα) for any α ∈ [0, 1).
Theorem 3. Let l < h be such that h/l ∈ O(nα) for some α ∈ [0, 1). There
does not exist a polynomial-time, monotone, constant-fraction welfare-preserving
transformation, even when the transformation is allowed to be randomized and
adaptive and make a polynomial number of queries to F .
Proof. We extend the example for the case where h/l is constant (Theorem 2).
Let b > c > d > e > 1 be constants that we will choose later. Suppose that the
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three blocks have length mb,mc, and me, respectively, and that there are md 1’s
in the middle block. We construct inputs B1, B2, . . . , Bm+1 as before. In order
for the same argument to go through, we need three conditions:
1. For the transformation to necessarily return a subset of C at the special
input B1, we need m
d ≥ me(mb + mc + me)α. This translates roughly to
d ≥ e+ bα. Since α < 1, it is possible to choose such b > d > e.
2. For queries to A to succeed with low probability, we need
(
mb+mc
mc−m
)
·poly(n) <
(
mb+mc
mc
)
. This always holds for b > c > 1.
3. For queries to F to succeed with low probability, we need
(
mc
m
)
·
(
mc−me
md−me
)
·
poly(n) <
(
mc
md
)
. This translates roughly to m(c−d)m
e
−cm > poly(n), which
always holds for c > d > e > 1.
Hence we can choose b, c, d, e so that all three conditions hold, and our proof is
complete. ⊓⊔
Note that the examples so far cannot be used to show the non-existence of
a monotone (constant-fraction) approximation-ratio-preserving transformation.
Indeed, consider the transformation that simply returns the canonical allocation
D. The points at which this transformation fails to preserve the welfare of the
algorithm are points at which the algorithm is optimal, and elsewhere the algo-
rithm is far from optimal, implying that the approximation ratio is preserved.
3.3 Approximation-ratio-preserving transformations
In this subsection, we consider a weaker benchmark than preserving full welfare
pointwise: preserving the approximation ratio. We show that this benchmark is
still impossible to satisfy if we restrict the transformation T to querying inputs
at Hamming distance less than some function f(n) ∈ o(n) from its input, and
disallow T from querying F .
Theorem 4. Let l < h be such that h/l is constant, and let f(n) ∈ o(n). There
does not exist a polynomial-time, monotone, approximation-ratio-preserving trans-
formation T . The transformation T is allowed to be randomized and adaptive,
but it cannot make queries to F and can only make queries to A on inputs that
are of Hamming distance less than f(n) from the original input.
Proof. Suppose that the input is of length n = 2m, and consider the algorithm
A as follows:
– At any input with at most m+ f(n) h’s, A returns
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . .0
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . . 1;
– At any other input, A returns
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . . 1
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . . 0.
One can check that approxF (A) = l/h. LetB1 denote the input
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
ll . . . l.
We have A(B1) =
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 . . .0
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . .1. At input B1, the transformation T cannot
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discover the other (undominated) allocation because of the Hamming distance
restriction. Hence it must return a subset of A(B1). Moreover, since the approx-
imation ratio of A is worst at input B1, T must return exactly A(B1).
Consider the input B2 =
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hh . . . h
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
hll . . . l, with the only change from B1 being
in the leftmost position of the second half. By monotonicity, T must return a
subset of A(B1) at B2. Moreover, for large enough n, to preserve the approxi-
mation ratio, T must return at least one 1 on l in the second half.
Similarly, we can define inputs B3, B4, . . . , Bm+2f(n)+1 so that Bi has i−1 h’s
in the second half and there is still a 1 corresponding to an l in the second half.
A sufficient condition to guarantee a 1 on an l in the second half is that putting
1’s on all h’s in the second half is not enough to match the approximation ratio
l/h. That is, 2f(n)·hmh <
l
h . Since f(n) ∈ o(n), we can choose n large enough so
that this condition is satisfied.
For each of the inputs B3, B4, . . . , Bm+2f(n)+1, T must return a subset of
A(B1). At input Bm+2f(n)+1, however, T cannot discover the allocation A(B1)
because of the Hamming distance restriction. Hence T cannot succeed. ⊓⊔
If we are only interested in preserving a constant factor of the approximation
ratio, then Theorem 8 shows that this is possible in the same setting of h/l
constant, and Theorem 5 shows that it is also possible when h/l ∈ Ω(n). It is
not clear whether a negative result can be obtained when h/l ∈ O(nα) for some
α ∈ (0, 1).
4 Positive Results
In this section, we consider the powers of black-box transformations in downward-
closed environments. We show that when values are either high or low, and the
ratio between high and low is Ω(n), then there is a monotone transformation that
gives a constant approximation to the welfare of any given algorithm pointwise,
and therefore also preserves the approximation ratio up to a constant factor.
This can be generalized to any constant number of values, and the transforma-
tion can be modified so that it also preserves full welfare at a constant fraction
of the inputs. While these results are of independent interest, they also serve to
demonstrate the limitations of extending the negative results in Section 3. For
the strongest possible results, we exhibit transformations that do not query F
or operate adaptively.
4.1 Two values
We begin by showing that when the private valuations take on two values that
are far apart, there exists a transformation that preserves a constant fraction
of the welfare at each input. This contrasts with the negative result when the
values are close to each other (Theorem 3).
12 W. Suksompong
Theorem 5. Let l < h be such that h/l ∈ Ω(n). There exists a polynomial-time,
monotone, constant-fraction welfare-preserving transformation.
Proof. First we give a high-level intuition of the transformation. A monotone
transformation needs to ensure that for any two adjacent inputs, it does not
simultaneously occur that a 0 appears on h and a 1 on l in the differing position.
As such, we would like to use the downward-closedness to “zero out” the l’s
in a given input to avoid the undesirable situation. If the algorithm already
returns a 1 on some h for the input, this can be done while still preserving a
constant fraction of the welfare. Otherwise, we look at nearby inputs and take
an allocation that would return a 1 on some h for our input, if such an allocation
exists.
We now formally describe the transformation T . Given an input v, T pro-
ceeds as follows:
1. If A(v) already has a 1 on h, “zero out” all the l’s, and return that allocation.
2. Else, if some input adjacent to v has an allocation that would yield a 1 on h
at v, take that allocation and zero out all the l’s, and return that allocation.
(Pick arbitrarily if there are many such allocations.)
3. Else, if some input of Hamming distance 2 away from v has an allocation that
would yield a 1 on h at v, take that allocation and zero out all the l’s, and
return that allocation. (Pick arbitrarily if there are many such allocations.)
4. Else, return A(v).
The transformation takes polynomial time, and it only zeroes out the l’s
when the allocation already has a 1 on h. Since h/l = Ω(n), a constant fraction
of the welfare is preserved pointwise.
It remains to show that the resulting allocation rule is monotone. Suppose
for contradiction that for some neighboring inputs v and w, at the position
where the two inputs differ, there exists a 0 on h at v, and a 1 on l at w. The
allocation at w cannot have changed in Steps 1, 2, or 3 of the transformation,
and w has 0 on all the h’s. But then v must have started with 0 on all the h’s,
except possibly at the position where the two inputs differ, because otherwise w
would have changed in Step 2. At the differing position, however, v must have
started with 0 too, because otherwise it could never become 0. Now, v must have
changed in Step 2, because the allocation at w satisfies the criterion in that step.
It did not change to the allocation at w, because otherwise the non-monotonicity
would not have occurred. Hence it must have changed to some other input with
a 1 on h. But then w should have changed to that allocation too in Step 3, a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
Note that the transformation in Theorem 5 might preserve full welfare at
a very small number of inputs. Indeed, if A returns the allocations with all
1’s at every input, then T preserves full welfare at only 2 out of the 2n inputs.
Nevertheless, we can improve the transformation so that not only does it preserve
a constant fraction of the welfare pointwise, but it also preserves full welfare at a
1/n fraction of the inputs. To this end, we will need to make a slightly stronger
assumption that h/l > n.
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Theorem 6. Let l < h be such that h/l > n. There exists a polynomial-time,
monotone, constant-fraction welfare-preserving transformation that preserves the
full welfare at a 1/n fraction of the inputs.
Proof. We exhibit such a transformation T , which is a slight modification of the
transformation in Theorem 5.
We call an allocation (implicitly along with an input) an h-allocation if it has
a 1 on h at the input, and an l-allocation otherwise. For any allocation (again
implicitly along with an input), call another allocation a higher h-allocation if
it yields strictly more 1’s on h than the original allocation at the input.
Given any input v, the transformation T proceeds as follows:
1. IfA(v) is an h-allocation, consider its adjacent inputs. If the allocation at one
of these inputs would yield a higher h-allocation at v, take that allocation.
(Pick arbitrarily if there are many such allocations.)
2. Simulate Step 1 for all inputs of Hamming distance 1 and 2 away from v.
3. If the allocation at v is an l-allocation, consider its adjacent inputs. If the
allocation at one of these inputs would yield an h-allocation at v, take that
allocation. (Pick arbitrarily if there are many such allocations.)
4. If the allocation at v is still an l-allocation, consider the inputs of Hamming
distance 2 away from v. If the allocation at one of these inputs would yield
an h-allocation for v, take that allocation. (Pick arbitrarily if there are many
such allocations.)
5. If the allocation at v has improved to a higher h-allocation than the original
allocation, zero out all the l’s.
6. Simulate Steps 1 through 5 for all inputs adjacent to v. Call the allocations
at this point provisional allocations.
7. For any 1 on l, zero it out only if it yields a monotonicity conflict with the
provisional allocation at a neighboring input.
The transformation takes polynomial time. One can check in a similar way as
in Theorem 5 that the resulting allocation rule is monotonic, and that a constant
fraction of the welfare is preserved pointwise. We now show that a 1/n fraction
of the inputs obtain weakly better welfare. In particular, for each input that
obtains strictly less welfare, we will find a neighbor that obtains weakly better
(in fact, strictly better) welfare.
An input obtains strictly less welfare only if it has to zero out an l in Step 7.
That means that the input has a 1 on l. In particular, its allocation has never been
changed in Steps 1 through 6. On the other hand, a neighbor has a provisional
allocation with a 0 on h in that position. Assume, for contradiction, that the
neighbor obtains less (or equal) welfare than before. That means that it has
never changed to a better allocation during the execution of the transformation.
But then one of the two inputs could have gotten strictly more h’s by taking the
allocation of the other, a contradiction.
Hence, every time an input loses a 1 on l, it can point to a neighbor that got
better. Each input that got better can be pointed to at most n − 1 times. Let
W be the set of inputs that got worse. We have |W | ≤ (n− 1) · (2n − |W |), and
therefore |W | ≤ n−1n · 2
n, as desired. ⊓⊔
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If h/l > 2n, the transformation in Theorem 6 also preserves the expected
welfare over the uniform distribution over the 2n inputs, as we show next.
Theorem 7. Let l < h be such that h/l > 2n. There exists a polynomial-
time, monotone, constant-fraction welfare-preserving transformation that pre-
serves full welfare at a 1/n fraction of the inputs and preserves expected welfare
over the uniform distribution over the 2n inputs.
Proof. Consider the transformation in Theorem 6. Every time an input loses a 1
on l, it can point to a neighbor that got better. The welfare of that neighbor has
increased by at least h−nl > nl. Since each input that got better can be pointed
to at most n− 1 times, the expected welfare over the uniform distribution over
the 2n inputs is preserved. ⊓⊔
Finally, we consider the other extreme case where h/l is constant. In this case,
simply returning a constant allocation already preserves a constant fraction of
the approximation ratio. We focus on the allocation A(ll . . . l), but a similar
statement can be obtained for any other constant allocation. The result can also
be extended to the case where we have multiple input values, all of which are
within a constant factor of each other.
Theorem 8. Let l < h be arbitrary values (possibly depending on n), and let T
be a transformation that returns the constant allocation A(ll . . . l) at any input.
Then T preserves an l/h fraction of the approximation ratio.
Proof. One can check that T (A)(v) ≥ A(ll . . . l) for any input v. Moreover, we
have that OPT (v) ≤ hl ·OPT (ll . . . l), since any allocation at v would return at
least an l/h fraction of the welfare when allocated to the input ll . . . l. Hence
approxF (T (A)) = min
v
T (A)(v)
OPTF (v)
≥
l · A(ll . . . l)
h · OPTF(ll . . . l)
≥
l
h
· approxF (A),
as desired. ⊓⊔
Combining this theorem with Theorem 5, we have that a constant fraction of
the approximation ratio can be preserved if either h/l is constant or h/l ∈ Ω(n).
This means that if we were to obtain a negative result with two values, it would
have to be the case that h/l lies strictly between constant and linear.
4.2 Multiple values
In this subsection, we show that we can generalize the transformation in Theorem
5 to the case where we have multiple input values, each pair separated by a ratio
of Ω(n). Recall that when some two input values are separated by O(nα) for
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some α ∈ [0, 1), we have from Theorem 3 that it is impossible to preserve a
constant fraction of the welfare pointwise. Hence we have a complete picture of
constant-fraction welfare-preserving transformations for multiple input values as
well.
Theorem 9. Let k be a constant, and let a1, . . . , ak be such that ai+1/ai ∈ Ω(n)
for i = 1, . . . , k−1. There exists a polynomial-time, monotone, constant-fraction
welfare-preserving transformation.
Moreover, if ai+1/ai > n for all i, then the transformation can be modified
so that it also preserves full welfare at a 1/(k − 1)n fraction of the inputs.
Proof. We first consider the case where there are three input values h,m, l, and
focus only on preserving a constant fraction of the welfare pointwise. It is possible
to extend to any constant number of inputs k and also preserve full welfare for
a 1/(k − 1)n fraction of the inputs, and we explain that later.
For any allocation (implicitly along with an input), we call it an h-allocation
if it has a 1 on h at the input. Otherwise, we call it an m-allocation if it has a 1
onm at the input. Finally, we call it an l-allocation if it is neither an h-allocation
nor an m-allocation. For any allocation (again implicitly along with an input),
call another allocation a higher allocation if it yields either strictly more 1’s on
h than the original allocation at the input, or an equal number of 1’s on h and
strictly more 1’s on m.
We exhibit a transformation T that preserves a constant fraction of the
welfare pointwise. Given any input v, the transformation T proceeds as follows:
1. If A(v) is an l-allocation, and some input adjacent to v has an allocation that
would yield an m-allocation or an h-allocation at v, or if A(v) is currently
an m-allocation, and some input adjacent to v has an allocation that would
yield an h-allocation at v, take that allocation for the time being. (Pick
arbitrarily if there are many such allocations.)
2. If the allocation at v is currently an l-allocation, and some input at Hamming
distance 2 away from v has an allocation that would yield an m-allocation
at v, take that allocation for the time being. (Pick arbitrarily if there are
many such allocations.)
3. If the allocation at v is currently not an h-allocation, and some input at
Hamming distance 3 away from v has an allocation that would yield an h-
allocation at v, take that allocation for the time being. (Pick arbitrarily if
there are many such allocations.)
4. If the allocation at v is currently an m-allocation, and some input at Ham-
ming distance 4 away from v has an allocation that would yield an h-
allocation at v, take that allocation for the time being. (Pick arbitrarily
if there are many such allocations.)
5. If the allocation at v is currently an l-allocation, and some input at Hamming
distance 5 away from v has an allocation that would yield an h-allocation
at v, take that allocation for the time being. (Pick arbitrarily if there are
many such allocations.)
16 W. Suksompong
6. If the allocation at v is currently an h-allocation, zero out all the m’s and
l’s. If it is an m-allocation, zero out all the l’s. Return the current allocation
A(v).
The transformation runs in polynomial time. One can check in a similar way
as in Theorem 5 that the resulting allocation rule is monotone. Moreover, since
h/m,m/l ∈ Ω(n), a constant fraction of the welfare is preserved pointwise.
As mentioned, it is possible to extend the transformation to any constant
number of inputs k and also preserve full welfare for a 1/(k − 1)n fraction of
the inputs. Suppose that the input values are a1 < a2 < · · · < ak. Then the
transformation takes O(k2) steps.
– ?→?
– a1 → a2
– ?→ a3
– a2 → a3
– a1 → a3
– ?→ a4
– a1 → a4
– a2 → a4
– a3 → a4
– . . .
– an−1 → an
In each step, the transformation considers allocations at inputs at Hamming
distance one higher than the previous step. If the change in the type of allocation
(e.g., from an a2-allocation to an a5-allocation) matches the specified change in
that step, the transformation executes the change. The question mark (e.g.,
? → a3) denotes any allocation. Finally, the transformation zeroes out all the
input values other than the highest one of the allocation. One can check that
this transformation preserves a constant fraction of the welfare pointwise. We
can extend it in a similar way as in Theorem 6 so that the transformation also
preserves full welfare at a 1/(k − 1)n fraction of the inputs. ⊓⊔
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